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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
THE INTERNATIONAL BARRIERS TO RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Renewable energy is increasingly seen as a possible solution to problems such as climate 
change, population growth, economic development, and the limitations of traditional 
energy sources.  Existing research on the international barriers to Renewable Energy 
Development (RED) is relatively dispersed and has not been subjected to empirical 
testing.  This paper argues that the largest barrier to RED is a lack of enabling policies 
and regulatory frameworks.  Using the degree of state interventionism as a proxy for 
enabling policies and regulatory frameworks, this paper expects a curvilinear relationship 
between government ownership of enterprise and RED.  A cross national statistical 
analysis for the 1990-2006 period finds empirical support for many of the proposed 
barriers to RED.  This paper provides researchers and policy makers alike with a better 
understanding of the international barriers to RED. 
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The issues surrounding energy play an increasingly salient role in the study of 
international relations and environmental politics and policy.  Increasing oil prices and 
growing demand for energy on the global scale have shaped an environment in which 
renewable energy development is becoming more relevant.  On the international stage, 
much variation in levels of renewable energy development exists, with some states 
having relatively sophisticated levels of renewable energy development and others 
exhibiting little progress.  Yet little work on this subject exists in the field of Political 
Science.  By examining barriers to renewable energy development across different 
countries, this research attempts to explain why some countries are more likely to invest 
in renewable energy than others. 
 To put this all into context, it is helpful to start with two illustrative examples.  
The United States currently exhibits relatively low levels of RED (the U.S. scores a .016 
on the Renewable Energy Index presented later).  However, the United States is one of 
the most developed countries in the world and scores a perfect score on the GDP Index of 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2009).  This is particularly 
puzzling because countries ranked lower on the GDP Index have higher levels of RED.  
For example, a country like Mozambique, which is said to exhibit a low level of human 
development, currently has over 10 times the level of renewable energy development 




it that an economic powerhouse invests so little in RED compared to a much poorer 
country?   
 These two examples illustrate concerns immediately relevant for this project.  
While the political, social, and economic circumstances surrounding each of these 
situations could not be more different, these examples reveal two insights for the study of 
RED.  Few would guess that Mozambique has higher levels of RED than the U.S.  
Further, the examples of countries that are struggling are much more common than those 
that have done well.  In an increasingly interconnected world, the overall lack of 
countries with significant renewable energy portfolios indicates that there may be barriers 
that the struggling countries share in common.  What are variables that can explain RED 
successes and failures? 
 Renewable energy is generally assumed to be normatively beneficial.  Part of 
what makes the general lack of renewable energy portfolios internationally so puzzling is 
that renewable energy is a solution to a number of problems.  Renewable energy can 
provide for social, environmental, and economic welfare.  Additionally, the development 
of renewable forms of energy could provide a sustainable way for the developing world 
to make progress, provide for a larger global population than the increasingly scarce 
traditional forms of energy, and reduce the rate of emissions of greenhouse gases 
associated with those traditional forms of energy.  Undoubtedly, the actualization of these 
theoretical propositions is a question that goes far beyond the scope of this paper and will 
be left for the time being.  However, the overall favor that renewable energy seems to 
find combined with its relative scarcity suggests that there exists a need to empirically 
examine the obstacles to something that is almost universally seen as beneficial.  With 
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this in mind, this project asks: what are the international barriers to renewable energy 
development?  
Research on the barriers to Renewable Energy Development (RED) is important 
in a number of ways.  This paper makes several contributions to earlier research.  First, 
much of the work on the topic up and to this point has been qualitative in nature.  While 
there is great value in this research, there is a need to quantitatively evaluate the 
international barriers to renewable energy development for several reasons.  Second, this 
research will add an element that has been missing to a body of knowledge and 
understanding about RED.  By exploring and then evaluating the existing conceptual and 
theoretical work in the field, this work will be able to indicate to scholars if any of the 
proposed barriers are cross-nationally significant.  In doing so, the empirical 
identification of significant barriers also indicates where scholars should focus their 
research efforts.  Finally, it entertains the possibility of directing policy makers to the 
most appropriate areas for policy development in the immediate future.    
This work will start by examining the literature on the topic and sketching the 
contours of extant scholarly understandings.  After uncovering some of the main strands 
of thought on the subject, it will move on examine the logic of these arguments.  
Thereafter, this work will make the argument that the largest international barrier is a 
function of enabling policies and regulatory frameworks. This paper expects that the level 
of enabling policies and regulatory frameworks, measured here by degree of state 
interventionism, explains RED internationally in a curvilinear relationship.  The paper 





The literature on renewable energy is disjointed.  The discussion is far from 
developed and comes from a number of different fields.   In fact, some of the separate 
conversations do not even seem to engage one another.  That said, after providing a 
historical analysis to set the stage, this work will attempt to pull apart the conversation 
and identify the main strands of thought on the subject.  This work will start by 
examining the most significant discussion found in the literature.  In looking at the debate 
between technological and market approaches, this work will examine how each 
approach developed and where each stands today.  After discussing the advances that 
have taken place within this debate, this paper will then inspect two other significant 
strands of work that came out of this period.  In then examining the „kitchen sink‟ and the 
„context specific‟ perspectives, this project will highlight the most relevant strands of 
thought for this work.  
There are a couple of early works on the subject that set the stage for much of the 
contemporary thinking.  In some of the older studies on renewable energy, the linkages 
between energy consumption and economic development were used for making 
normative arguments for renewables (see, for example, Ali, 1981).  Further, despite 
differing opinions about the potential effects of those linkages, Renewable Energy 
Technologies (RET‟s) were seen as a solution to the developing world‟s woes.  
Goldemberg, for example, argued of developing countries that, “…they do not have to 
reach high values of the E/GDP ratio even in their initial stages of industrialization 
because they can benefit from the modern methods..” (ibid, 16).  Clearly, renewable 
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energy found normative support and the relationship between energy consumption and 
economic development was a crucial aspect of the early conversation.     
As time progressed, a discussion of the obstacles to RED began to develop.  As 
Clay observed, there are a variety of obstacles including costs, infrastructure, incentives 
and policies that can act as barriers between developing countries and renewable energy 
(2002, 30).  Clay‟s evaluation qualitatively examines the technical, educational, 
economic, and cultural barriers to renewable development.  Clay concluded that the 
industrialization and urbanization of developing countries leads to increased energy needs 
and that “because so many areas in developing countries still lack any substantial energy 
programs at all, the time is ripe to develop and implement projects that depend on 
renewable rather than nonrenewable energy sources from the start” (ibid, 33).  This 
conclusion became a common refrain in the literature and reiterated the justifications in 
favor of renewable energy found in the economic development discourse.    
A dialogue surrounding technology and the market also played a noteworthy role 
in the earlier conversations. Elliot, in a telling summary of that conversation, finds that 
the approaches to examining renewable development worldwide used two underlying 
distinctions.  One approach dealt with the supply side through „technology pushes‟ and 
the other dealt with the demand side with „market pulls‟ (2005, 219). In somewhat related 
findings, Owen argued that there were actually three overlapping perspectives on the 
obstacles for renewables: 1) the „research, development, and deployment‟ perspective; 2) 
the „market barrier‟s perspective; and 3) the market transformation perspective (2006, 
632).  Over time, however, the emphasis in the larger work shifted away from the more 
research and development (R&D) or technological perspective. For example, Elliot finds 
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that the problems that are harder to resolve than technology are the institutional 
implementation and social problems (2000, 261).  Elliot then took this observation one 
step further and argued that, “The current financial, organizational, and institutional 
environment is not very well suited to [Renewable Energy Technology] acceptance: there 
is, arguably, something of a mis-match between the new technology and the existing 
support infrastructure,” (2000: 262). 
From this point, the literature began to shift away from the technological 
perspective.  In a telling observation of the shifting foundations of renewable energy, 
Martinot et al. make note that, “Changing investment patterns make it more important to 
think about markets for renewable energy, rather than simply about the technologies 
themselves and their economic characteristics,” (2002:310).  In fact, Elliot, in moving 
beyond Martinot et al., argued, “The shift was only partly due to the successful 
emergence of viable technologies from the R&D phase…It was arguably much more a 
result of a political shift away from government intervention and on to the market led 
developments, with the emphasis being on achieving competitive success,” (220).  While 
this sort of emphasis is most prevalent in the UK and US, it makes sense that it can also 
be seen elsewhere. 
Subsequent work placed a greater emphasis on market-based perspectives.  There 
was, however, an apparent problem.  As Owen notes, the conventional energy markets 
and their historical contexts can in and of themselves act as a hurdle for renewable energy 
development (2006, 632).  While governments were increasingly hesitant to intervene 
and allowed the markets achieve competitive success on their own, there were other 
barriers creating dissonance in this process.  As the market transformation literature 
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progressed, it became clear that the relationship between renewable markets and 
government intervention was of particular interest.  For example, Volpi argued that, “… 
the „first‟ barrier to greater renewable energy penetration is the lack of enabling policy 
and regulatory frameworks, which usually favor traditional forms of energy sources” 
(ibid, 88).  In this way, and while attempting to operate in a context designed for 
substantially different forms of energy, renewable energies were generally left to fight for 
themselves. 
The examination of the more laissez faire approach then led to discussions 
surrounding the self-directed liberalization and privatization of state-specific markets.  
This discussion was further complicated by the observation that pressures also came from 
outside sources such as International Financial Institutions (IFI).  In fact, this was evident 
in the imposition of liberalization and privatization upon markets (Volpi, 89).  Over the 
last 15 years, such reforms have dealt with primarily economic objectives (with little to 
no attention paid to environmental and social impacts), which gets more complicated 
when coupled with the fact that there has also been a reduction in incentives for 
renewable energies (Volpi, 89).  Not only, then, does one see countries making this 
choice, but outside entities were also imposing this choice upon others. 
As the dialogue grew, so too did the need to examine the perceived hesitancy 
toward enabling policies and regulatory frameworks.  As seen earlier, the market 
environment was complicated by the existence of infrastructures that support 
conventional forms of energy.  The market perspective then began to look at the 
relationship between infrastructures, enabling policies and regulatory frameworks, and 
renewable energy development.  Volpi argued that the fact that more traditional forms of 
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energy still benefit from massive subsidies including more direct forms like tax 
reductions and R&D funds acted as barrier to renewable energy development (ibid, 89).  
While the prevalence of these sorts of subsidies is certainly decreasing, according to the 
UNDP, in 2000 they still amounted to around $150 billion (2000, and as seen in Volpi). 
This does not even take into account hidden environmental costs or other types of 
subsidies such as, “… obligations to purchase a certain form of energy, reduced 
electricity rates for large (usually industrial) users, infrastructural support and exemptions 
from risks or liabilities” (Volpi, 89). 
Over time, a number of fields began to weigh in on the barriers to renewable 
energy development.  Despite the shift away from the technological perspective to the 
market-based perspective, there was still the need for a more concrete understanding of 
exactly what those barriers were.  Martinot et al., in a telling summary of this shift, found 
that a substantial amount of the market-oriented literature leaned toward end-use 
applications, projects, or countries, and that “a global overview has been missing” (ibid, 
312).  Martinot et al.‟s immediate concern was more market-oriented approaches, but 
little had been done to evaluate the international barriers to renewable energy penetration 
more generally.   The growing debates surrounding globalization, and the privatization 
and liberalization of markets internationally, however, ushered in a new era.  At this 
point, it was clear that the market-based perspective was of particular interest and further 
exploration was necessary. 
Gradually, two other conversations worthy of discussion began to surface.  To this 
point, there were now a number of possible barriers on the table and the two separate 
conversations, referred to here as the „kitchen sink‟ and the „context-specific‟ strands, 
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then began to enter the discussion.  For the first, questions surrounding the role that 
economics, society, and politics play in RED through market-oriented approaches or 
socioeconomic systems were still theoretically relevant.  In the most characteristic 
summary of this strand, Volpi, in quoting a report for the Group of Eight from the 
Renewable Energy Task Force, argued that, “the barriers to renewable energy are not 
technological, but rather political, financial, educational and related infrastructure” (ibid, 
88).  However, arguing that the barriers are political, financial, educational, and related 
infrastructural is far too broad.  This strand of the literature seemingly began to co-opt all 
of the potentially relevant barriers.  They then threw them all into the discussion, along 
with the proverbial „kitchen sink‟. 
To be sure, there are a number of possible factors that can influence RED.  While 
one can argue that “the international barriers are economic, social, and political,” most of 
these factors each combine in a context specific manner that ultimately tells the interested 
scholar little about the possibilities of international barriers.  In arguing that the largest 
barrier is social, for example, it is clear that the relative complexity of social indicators 
and the context-specific nature of their influence shape a particular society‟s development 
of renewable energy.   When looking at the international level, however, little 
commonality exists among all countries.  As such, it offers little explanatory power at 
that level.  The same can also be said of economic barriers.  In many parts of the world, 
concerns over the economic realities of instituting new technologies and/or existing 
infrastructure can seem almost insurmountable barriers, but invoking economic barriers 
fails to describe why one advanced industrial country with an immeasurable economic 
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advantage suffers in some of the same ways as another country with far fewer means.  Of 
the possible barriers, however, there is a need to examine the political more closely. 
There is less clarity on the relevance of international political barriers.  For 
example, the political factors, like the commonly used measures of democracy (civil 
rights, political liberties, etc.) provide little explanatory value for understanding RED.  
Further, this proposition is so vague that it opens doors for a number of other 
theoretically relevant political barriers.  For example, as seen earlier, it makes sense that a 
political system‟s willingness to intervene in renewable energy markets through 
regulatory frameworks and enabling policies can explain the success of certain countries 
and may even be common internationally.   Moreover, the „kitchen sink‟ strand had 
clearly been built upon the earlier discussions, and it ultimately said little about the 
possibility of international barriers that couldn‟t be seen in the market-based perspectives. 
Alongside the „kitchen sink‟ approach was a growing dialogue about the 
complexities surrounding the barriers to renewable energy development.  In a telling 
observation, Geller observes that: 
“A wide range of barriers limit the introduction and deployment of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy technologies throughout the world.  The significance of the different 
barriers varies among sectors, institutions, and regions.  Some of the barriers will shrink 
as energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies advance and gain market share, 
but others are likely to persist unless directly confronted through policy interventions. 
Taken as a whole, these barriers are inhibiting the transition to a more sustainable energy 
future,” (2003:33).       
 
From this, one can tease out two important observations.  First, this makes it is clear that 
in the broader discussion a „wide range‟ of barriers is still in play, and little has been done 
to fully analyze the significance of these earlier perspectives.  Second, this also brings to 
light a growing dialogue about the relevant levels of analysis.  While the analysis of the 
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international barriers to RED is clearly still relevant, it is also clear that certain aspects of 
the broader dialogue began to focus more intently upon regional and domestic levels. 
 Subsequently, a second perspective focusing on context-specific explanations 
began to develop in the literature.   For example, Painuly finds that the barriers to 
renewable energy technology penetration include “cost-effectiveness, technical barriers, 
and market barriers such as inconsistent pricing structures, institutional, political and 
regulatory barriers, and social and environmental barriers” (2001, 75).  Painuly‟s 
immediate concern, however, was what individual countries could do and his work 
proposes a framework for the identification and analysis of the barriers to renewable 
penetration at the state level (ibid, 77).  In fact, there were others also calling for state 
level identification and analysis. For example, as Johansson et al. argue, “The potential of 
markets for renewable energy and the role played by the public sector depend on the 
specific conditions in each country and region” (2004, 26).  In taking this one step 
further, Painuly argued that these barriers also vary across countries and technologies 
(2001, 74).  Clearly, the evaluation of the barriers to renewable energy development at 
the state level was justified, and many of the works to date seem to take this to heart (see, 
for example, Komor). 
Ultimately, however, this discussion said little about the possibility of 
international barriers.  In following this strand further, one can expect that when looking 
at the levels of development separately, many of the barriers proposed in the literature 
begin to make more sense than they did at the international level.  For example, it would 
make sense that economic indicators would be statistically significant for developing 
countries.  In all reality, this might be so because when scholars talk about international 
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economic barriers, more generally, they are actually referring to developing countries.  It 
makes intuitive sense that a lack of available start-up capital for RED acts as a barrier for 
the developing world, but it does not make sense when referring to developed nations 
who posses that capital. This may also be true for level of education.  In terms of political 
factors, however, it seems reasonable to expect that they will matter, but that there are 
also a number of intervening variables which carry varying weight depending upon level 
of development and that much more research has to be done in this regard. 
 In summary, while the „technology push‟ or „research, development, and 
deployment‟ approaches to the barriers to renewable energy development were initially 
informative, as time progressed, other and possibly more significant barriers came to the 
forefront of the discussion. In many ways, it seems as though even if these technologies 
were perfected at this point, that the institutional, market, and industrial contexts within 
in which they operate would still provide challenges.  For now, it is also clear that both 
the kitchen sink and context-specific perspectives offer little explanatory value for an 
evaluation of the international barriers to renewable energy development.  However, 
there is something still relevant within the market perspective.  This literature indicates 
the relationship between interventionism and renewable energy development may hold 
the key to understanding the international barriers to renewable energy development. 
 
Theoretical Development: 
 The development of the literature surrounding the barriers to renewable energy is 
instructive.  While there were a number of potential barriers available for any scholar of 
the subject, a general overall lack of RED does indicate there are still significant 
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international barriers to RED.  Further, while the technological perspective, the „kitchen 
sink‟ and the context perspective strands are informative, the conversation surrounding 
the market perspectives is clearly the most relevant for a systematic international 
analysis.  This section will start with an example and move on to outlining the most 
important aspects of this conversation.  The paper then argues that the most relevant 
barriers to renewable energy development are enabling policies and regulatory 
frameworks.  This work also suggests that such barriers are best approximated by 
analyzing the level of state interventionism, and hypothesizes that the relationship 
between renewable energy development and state level interventionism is curvilinear. 
 The case of the United States provides an excellent illustration of the forces at 
play.  It is clear from the literature review that the U.S. has been largely unwilling to 
intervene in renewable energy markets.  This unwillingness, largely the result of a 
general lack of enabling policies and regulatory frameworks on the part of renewable 
energy, has acted as a significant barrier.  Admittedly, the relationship is complicated by 
the fact that the markets of more traditional forms of energy enjoy governmental support 
in the form of enabling policies and regulatory frameworks early on.  While one market is 
expected to achieve success in the free market, interventions in another create an uneven 
playing field.  In many ways, this uneven playing field also stands in the way of the 
success of renewable energy markets.  However, it is that very lack of market 
intervention in the form of enabling policies and regulatory frameworks that is argued to 
explain the lack of RED in the U.S.  Moreover, because of a number of other factors such 
as the spread neoliberal economic policies internationally, it seems reasonable to think 
that this may also be common internationally. 
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 The inherent problem, then, is that traditional energy benefits from a long and 
prosperous history of government intervention, whereas renewable energy development, 
by many accounts argued to be better for economic development and both environmental 
and human welfare, did not experience such government support.  While this paper is not 
about taking a side in this debate, it seems that it offers avenues for more successful 
investment in renewable energy.  First, if government intervention on the part of 
conventional energy has created healthy markets, the intervention on the part of 
renewables can be justified.  There is a large body of work advocating specific sorts of 
policies, regulatory frameworks, and subsidies for renewable energy development.  This 
is a contentious area with a number of potential benefits and costs.  Subsidies, in 
particular, can be a thorny issue.  As Martinot et al. show in a telling summary,  
“Lessons suggested by experience are that: (a) subsidies are unlikely to lead to 
sustainable markets unless they explicitly create conditions whereby they are no longer 
needed (i.e. smart subsidies); (b) subsidies can undermine private investments and 
business in new markets and should be applied with attention to private-sector conditions 
in a particular market; (c) subsidies can be used effectively to build up initial market 
volume, local expertise, user awareness, appropriate technology adaptation, quality 
standards, and entrepreneurial activities; (d) subsidies are more effective when tied to 
operating performance rather than investment; and (e) continuing subsidies may always 
be needed for poorer segments of the population,” (2002:332).   
 
Second, if renewables are expected to achieve competitive successes through 
more market-led developments, then the regulatory frameworks, enabling policies, and 
related subsidies that favor conventional energy should be removed.  In fact, the G8 
Renewable Energy Task Force is sympathetic to this cause and argue that, the “removal 
of these subsidies would reduce electricity use, encourage equal treatment of renewable 
vis-à-vis conventional energies, and increase their deployment,” (2001: 30). While this 
argument is quite agreeable to laissez faire economists, it is not as simple as it seems.  
Conventional energy companies are extremely wealthy and powerful, and the removal of 
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this sort of infrastructure, in most countries, is a difficult political process.  Indeed, the 
powers that favor their elimination are dwarfed by political constraints and years of 
institutionalization. 
 Therefore, the relationship between the enabling policies and regulatory 
frameworks and RED deserves more attention.  It seems that the degree of state 
intervention into energy markets through enabling policies and regulatory frameworks 
could be a common barrier at the international level.  It appears that the most successful 
states are the states that have intervened on the part of renewable energy markets. 
However, there are also countries with strongly interventionist policies but still 
struggle with RED.  Fortunately, the developmental discourse sheds light on these cases.  
From this discourse one can see that there were two early perspectives of market 
interventionism for the developing world.  According to LaPorta et al., the first was an 
optimistic developmental view in which economic growth focused on the necessity of 
financial development and advocated that governments own strategic economic sectors 
(2000, 3).  The second was a view that argued that the control of financial institutions by 
governments "politicizes resource allocation for the sake of getting votes or bribes for 
office holders, softens budget constraints, and lowers economic efficiency" (ibid, 4).  
While it seems that the first was embraced by a number of developing countries, LaPorta 
et al. found that over time what actually happens falls more in line with the second or 
more 'political' theories of the effects of firm ownership by governments.  What this 
means is that the embrace of this first developmental view by a number of countries, 
evident in control of those economic sectors, ended up doing much less than anticipated.   
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The above findings indicate that too much interventionism, seen in high levels of 
government control over financial institutions and other strategic economic sectors, 
actually weakens the economic development of these countries.  While the particulars of 
these findings, the objections, and their validity are beyond the scope of this research 
(and are admittedly matters of debate among economists), few would disagree that many 
of these countries did not benefit from strong interventionism (if only evident by the fact 
that most are still „developing‟ decades later). 
An example illustrates this dynamic. Countries such Albania or Sierra Leone 
exhibit high levels of interventionism but relatively low levels of RED.  The 
developmental discourse illustrates why one would see this discrepancy.  Albania and 
Sierra Leone‟s specific forms of interventionism did not adopt the appropriate path to 
development identified by LaPorta et al.  The key factor is an interventionism in the 
market through enabling policies and regulatory frameworks.  In these two cases, the 
interventionism was too extensive and the complete control of economic institutions by 
these governments was a step too far.  In fact, both of these particular examples are still 
struggling with development, which indicates that they fall in line with the expectations 
that too much interventionism has deleterious effects. 
This paper therefore expects that the relationship between interventionism and 
RED successes is curvilinear.  Following the above logic, it is expected that success in 
RED is difficult at either end of the interventionist spectrum.  The figure below illustrates 
the central expectation developed in this paper. 
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Figure 1: Hypothesized Curvilinear Relationship
 
The paper thus expects that moderate levels of government intervention are most likely to 
lead to greater levels of RED.  From this, this work hypothesizes: 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between government interventionism and 
renewable energy development is curvilinear. 
 
The illustrative examples show that it is not the enabling policies and regulatory 
frameworks which are to blame, but, rather, a particular prescription for economic 
development.  In this light, there even seems to be a difference between interventions 
intended to harness market forces and those that take complete control of financial 
institutions.   
  There can be a number of different influences at play in any market scenario.  Not 
only does the level of interventionism matter, but the amount of external influence can 
also shape a country‟s approach to the market.  Structural adjustment loans by the World 
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Bank ushered in trade liberalization through the 1980‟s and 1990‟s (see Wade, 1993).  
While the results of these policies may ostensibly fall in line with the argument at hand, it 
is worth noting that a developing country‟s market perspective can also be shaped by 
outside sources.  Related to this point, there are a number of domestic factors that come 
into play.  The shape, size, and strength of a great variety of possible domestic influences 
can drastically shape a market perspective and/or the policy and regulatory options 
available to the relevant actor(s).  However, the variety of influences and factors are 
intervening variables, and are beyond the scope of this project.  This research focuses on 
whether interventionism affects RED, and not what shapes that specific form of 
interventionism. 
 What, then, does this suggest for the argument developed here?  Level of 
development matters.  Further, the scale of interventionism and type and strength of 
institution matter.  Both domestic and international forces are also relevant.  The same 
can be said for additional economic, political, and social factors.  This argument, 
however, does not purport to understand how all of these other variables would matter.  
Simply listing the potential factors that matter does little to help scholars understand 
whether or not there are actually any international barriers to RED.  The argument 
expects that the largest common barrier to RED will be a lack of enabling policies and 
regulatory frameworks.  Anticipating a curvilinear relationship, the highest levels of RED 
are expected to be found in countries with moderate levels of interventionism. 
To conclude, while research should still evaluate how Volpi‟s barriers stand in the 
way of realizing RED potential for individual countries, that literature offers little on 
cross-nationally relevant factors.  A shift toward a better understanding of the enabling 
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policies and regulatory frameworks for renewable energy development at both the state 
and international levels will hopefully provide insight into renewable energy 
development and possibly suggest avenues for future research. 
 
Causal Implications: 
It is important to note that the causal implications coming from this analysis are 
limited. For instance, there are a number of possible intervening variables between 
enabling policies and regulatory frameworks and actual RED investment. However, there 
are also methodological reasons for not including these intervening variables.  This 
analysis is theoretically-motivated and “data mining” is unjust. Further, as King, 
Koehane, and Verba illustrate, “…in general, we should not control for an explanatory 
variable that is in part a consequence of our key explanatory variable” (1994, 174).  
Therefore, this does not weaken the proposition that enabling policies and regulatory 
frameworks deserve more attention but suggests that there are a number of factors at play 
which can ultimately shape RED outcomes that are beyond the scope of this work.  The 
relationship between RED and these frameworks nevertheless deserves more attention.  
Of the links suggested in the literature, enabling policies and frameworks also appear to 
be the most relevant barrier to RED.  However, there certainly is a need for better 
specification in the future. 
In addition, several assumptions drive this work.  First, this paper assumes, for the 
sake of analysis, that there is a relationship between enabling policies and government 
intervention.  Admittedly, there are a number of different types of policies and forms of 
intervention.  This paper assumes that most of these policies happen in the form of 
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government interventions in the market.  Arguably, this is also true of ex post facto 
laissez faire policies.  Removing the barriers to trade are, in effect, interventions in the 
market, but are not considered in this analysis.  Similarly, this paper assumes that by 
gaining insight into the relationship between a government‟s disposition to 
interventionism and RED, one also learns about the relationship between enabling 
policies and regulatory frameworks and RED.  There are certainly important differences 
between enabling policies and regulatory frameworks specifically targeted at increasing 
RED and overall government intervention.  Yet the purpose of this work is to take an 
initial empirical look at the possible barriers to RED and leaves more precise 
specifications to future work. 
This paper is also about the broader institutional disposition to RED.  Even if 
there were specific measures for Renewable Energy Policy, there may still be problems.  
The range of potential policies and the great regularity with which some governments 
pass policies that have little practical value, however, says little about a country‟s general 
disposition.  A country predisposed to a laissez-faire approach may pass a number of 
policies removing barriers to the market.  It is hard to quantify this predisposition.  In 
contrast, a relationship between RED and a broader institutional disposition, as captured 
by the level of government intervention, gives researchers more to work with.  Unlike a 
more specific measure, focusing on overall government intervention allows one to see at 
what level a laissez faire approach is able to succeed or fail.  For the task at hand, it is 




These theoretical insights inevitably lead to one immediate practical problem that 
must be discussed: the need for an adequate measure of Government Ownership of 
Enterprise (GOE).  The problem with this sort of measure is that it limits the causal 
statements available to the researcher (see, for example, Wacziarg 2002, 909).  GOE is 
unable to differentiate between the drivers of policy and anything about the 
endogeneity/exogeneity of that policy.  Because of the difficulty specifying both the 
drivers of and internal/external influences upon a policy‟s success, the certainty with 
which a researcher can determine cause is limited.  At the core of this work, however, is 
the general (and rarely random) disposition of a government to achieve a particular goal. 
In fact, it is readily accepted that the endogenous selection of policies can guide 
them in a number of ways.  There are a number of unobservable factors that can weigh in 
upon a policy‟s success and Rodrik identifies three: 1) the honesty of the government, 2) 
the extent of market imperfections, and 3) the capacity of the government to intervene 
effectively (2005, 5).  The problem, in these cases, is that it is difficult to identify whether 
the government is acting in the public‟s interest.  There is no way to tell whether the 
interests are private or public.  Fortunately, this particular analysis is neither about the 
effectiveness of specific policies nor about the motives of governments. 
What the paper is attempting to measure is whether there is a relationship between 
RED and intervention.  While the hypothesis is that the relationship is curvilinear, there is 
no causal distinction about the drivers of policy.  Generally, it is intuitive that the 
successes of RED will be limited at either end of the interventionist perspective.  Even if 
a specific measure of GOE for renewables (GOE-R) were available, the causal statements 
about the effectiveness of this form of ownership are still limited.  This is true because 
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the GOE-R would be a systematic response to market failures. As Rodrik illustrates, in 
these cases, there is no indication as to which of the potential drivers of policy is actually 
influencing outcomes (2005, 3).  While this work does employ the logic of these theories 
to build its hypothesis, it does not need to make this distinction.  In fact, this work is also 
taking into account those countries for which the policy response has been everything but 
a systematic response to market failures.  As seen in the neoliberal examples, the 
responses to many of the problems has been a hands-off approach. 
In addressing the barriers to renewable energy development, there are a number of 
difficulties in empirically evaluating the relationship between the enabling policies and 
regulatory frameworks in question, and RED.  However, GOE provides the best measure 
to date.  This project is also able to avoid some of the pitfalls traditionally associated with 
regressing growth with ownership of enterprise. In the future, further specification is 
undoubtedly necessary.  For the purposes of this work, however, the variable is sufficient 
to assess whether more research along these lines is even necessary. 
 
Research Design: 
 This paper has identified a number of possible barriers to Renewable Energy 
Development internationally.  One of these proposed barriers, enabling policies and 
regulatory frameworks is argued to be the key explanatory factor in the argument 
developed here.  This project conducts two quantitative analyses to analyze whether the 
argument is supported empirically. The unit of analysis for this study is the state, 
meaning that data are collected at the state level.  This project evaluates the proposed 
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barriers in a longitudinal, cross-national study.  The analysis employs data from 115 
countries and covers the period from 1990-2006. 
Dependent Variable: 
The dependent variable for the analyses is renewable energy development. Volpi 
provides a definition of renewable energy: “‟Renewable energy‟ commonly refers both to 
traditional biomass (firewood, animal wastes an crop residues burned in stoves) and 
modern technologies based on solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, small hydropower, wave 
and sea flow,” (ibid, 84).  This paper does not take large-scale hydro into account, which 
is also dismissed by much of the literature, including Volpi and Martinot et al., because 
of its environmental consequences and/or its relative maturity.  Hydroelectric power has 
been around for quite some time (the Hoover Dam, for example, being completed in 
1936) and the policies surrounding this form of renewable energy do not apply to this 
theoretical development.  Because of its long history, large-scale hydro electric power 
benefits from some of the same institutionalization as many of the other more traditional 
forms of energy.  The logic that holds for other forms of renewable energy does not 
apply, and it was not included. 
The dependent variable for these analyses, then, is renewable energy production 
at the state level.  As seen in previous arguments, land mass and resource allocation play 
differing roles in the development of renewable energies.  For example, areas with 
geothermal fluid are more likely to develop geothermal energy.  This project, however, is 
not about specific resources but rather examines what hinders a state from developing 
renewable energy more broadly.  The measurement of renewable resources takes both 
traditional and modern forms of renewable energy into account. These data are taken 
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from the International Energy Annual of the Energy Information Administration of the 
U.S. Government.
1
  The raw numbers of renewable production, however, do not take into 
account a variety of theoretically important insights, such as large fossil fuel reserves, 
and an index is created to find the best measure of renewable energy development. 
 The index of renewable energy development has three major components.  
Renewable energy production, total energy production, and total energy consumption are 
all important factors in moving beyond the potential pitfalls of raw numbers. In order to 
create the first component, the data for renewable energy are converted into quadrillion 
British Thermal Units (BTU‟s), the standard of measurement for the second two 
components.  The index starts by calculating renewable energy production as a 
percentage of total energy production.  This is important because a better picture of 
renewable energy as a part of the larger portfolio helps to alleviate concerns of land mass 
and resource allocation. The index then finds renewable energy production as percentage 
of total energy consumption.  While renewable energy consumption is important, its 
measurement does not exist.  However, it is unlikely that countries would export a 
significant amount of renewable energy.  Solar energy, for example, cannot be exported 
in the way that oil can.  It therefore makes sense for countries to consume renewables and 
export more tangible forms of energy, like coal and oil.  Since both averages are 
conceptually important, they are averaged to create the index. The index ranges from 0 to 




                                               
1
 International Energy Annual of the Energy Information Administration: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/contents.html 
2 It is important to clarify from the start that the data for the D.V. show a problematic distribution, skew, 
and kurtosis (Skew is 4.17 and Kurtosis is 29.4). Because the D.V. is a percentage between 0 and 1, 
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To illustrate cross-national variation in RED, the table below presents the 10 
countries with highest RED levels in 2006.   
 





The key independent variable for the analyses is the enabling policies and 
regulatory frameworks that have been identified as the most promising avenue for 
research.  There are important connections between these policies and frameworks and 
government intervention in the market.  The specific interest of this project is the 
relationship between market interventionism and RED.  Unfortunately, existing measures 
of market interventionism suffer from a number of problems.  This study briefly 
examines existing indicators in order to identify the best possible measure for this work. 
                                                                                                                                            
transformations do not normalize the data.  This analysis tried the series of log transformations (natural log 
and log(10)), square root, inverse and arc-sine transformations, and the Box-Cox method. In the end, none 
of these transformations worked, and the remainder employs Robust Standard Estimates to compensate for 















1 Benin 17.2044 0.000003 0.000010 0.039000 
2 Luxembourg 10.3536 0.000549 0.002688 0.201213 
3 Nicaragua 7.9487 0.001430 0.010290 0.071348 
4 Ireland 7.2052 0.005674 0.041709 0.704358 
5 Belize 6.5554 0.000224 0.006483 0.016144 
6 Jamaica 6.5243 0.000345 0.002684 0.163680 
7 Portugal 5.9633 0.016292 0.156298 1.084137 
8 Iceland 5.9431 0.008534 0.124157 0.170241 
9 Philippines 4.8431 0.033927 0.483465 1.271261 
10 Kenya 4.7030 0.003958 0.053181 0.201551 
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The most frequently used measure of market interventionism is the share of 
government investment in the private sector as a percentage of GDP.  While sufficient for 
some studies, it can be fairly inaccurate when analyzing interventionism globally. For 
example, Knowles and Garces-Ozanne note that high-performing Asian economies have 
a low level of government spending and taxation, yet higher levels of interventionism 
than other industrialized countries (2003, 451).  In fact, Knowles and Garces-Ozanne‟s 
central argument is that, “government spending is a poor proxy for government 
intervention more generally because in many countries around the world intervention is 
high even though government spending is low,” (ibid, 457).  Government investment in 
the private sector as a percentage of GDP, then, is not a satisfactory measure for a study 
including many states. 
While some have attempted to rectify this problem by using indexes of market 
interventionism, such measures suffer from other problems.  The same study argues that, 
“including all of [the components] in one index makes it impossible to isolate the effect 
of different types of intervention on economic growth,” ( ibid, 455). 
Knowles and Garces-Ozanne then evaluate three different measures of 
intervention and find that two of them, the degree of red tape present and the extent of 
government ownership, can be used as proxies for regulation of the economy (470).  
Unfortunately, data on government red tape are sparse and available only for a small 
number of cases.  The measure, borrowed from Morrow, is an index based upon standard 
questionnaires by Business International‟s (BI) correspondents in 70 countries from 
1980-83 (Mauro 1995, 682).  The time frame is insufficient for this project and the 
survey of 70 countries with BI correspondents would severely limit the number of cases. 
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The extent of government ownership is the final measure considered for this 
project.  Government Ownership of Enterprise (GOE), the indicator that Knowles and 
Garces-Ozanne use for their work, comes from Gwartney et al.‟s Economic Freedom of 
the World.
3
  While data for earlier years come from a variety of sources, most of the 
recent data come exclusively from the Government Financial Statistics database. 
However, the new data do not cover much of the developed world, where data are still 
collected from a number of sources and show some puzzling patterns.  Given the 
weaknesses of alternative indicators, it is nevertheless the most appropriate and complete 
proxy to date.  GOE data, calculated as gross fixed capital formation (public sector) as a 
share of gross fixed capital formation (total), are used to measure government regulation. 
The data for the 1990-2000 period are collected only in 5 year increments and, therefore, 
the values are carried forward for the years in between.  Since 2000, data have been 
collected on a yearly basis.  The data range from just under 2% ownership of enterprise to 
100%. 
Control Variables: 
Drawing onVolpi‟s work on the subject, this paper adds four control variables.  
As noted earlier, these proposed variables are political, economic, educational, and 
related infrastructural factors.  A number of general indicators are available for the first 
three variables and the project employs measures that are commonly used in the 
international relations literature.  Related infrastructure, however, is a much more elusive 
concept.  Fortunately, Volpi‟s conceptualization includes two characteristics seen 
elsewhere in the literature.  The first, enabling policies and regulatory frameworks, is the 
                                               
3
 Fraser Institute: http://www.freetheworld.com/datasets_efw.html 
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I.V. of interest for this project.  The second characteristic focuses upon outside funding, 
such as International Financial Institution (IFI) incentives, which presents a feasible 
avenue for measurement. For each of these control variables, the literature logically 
implies that the expected relationship will be significant, positive, and of at least 
moderate strength. Due to the hemispheric proliferation of neoliberal market philosophies 
and a number of counter examples, however, this paper expects less. 
 For the political factors affecting RED, a commonly used indicator is a measure 
for democracy.  The Polity 2 measure used by the Polity IV Project seems most 
appropriate for this study.  It indicates a country‟s democracy level raging from -10 to 
+10, ranging from most authoritarian to most democratic.
 4
  Data are available for most of 
the cases and come directly from the project.
5
  The literature, again, expects that the 
relationship will be significant, positive, and of moderate strength.  As seen in the case of 
the United States, however, some democracies are struggling with RED.  Clearly, the 
literature is grounded in more observations than one example can contest.  Therefore, this 
work allows for the relationship to be significant.  However, the paper also expects that 
the literature overstates the strength of the relationship between Democracy and REI.  
Some of the most democratic countries, like the U.S. and the U.K., still struggle. 
Therefore, the strength of the relationship is logically questionable. 
The second control variable accounts for economic factors.  This work employs 
the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of per capita GNI.  According to the United Nations 
                                               
4 The original Polity indicator contained measures for authority that do not make sense for a longitudinal 
analysis.  In 2002, Marshall and Jaggers set about fixing the problem by smoothing out minor fluctuations 
in these data.  For the Polity 2 measure, they point out that, “… the data codes general institutionalized 
authority traits that characterize a distinct polity (a polity distinguished by major regime changes at both its 
inception and its termination); annual case codes for all years between polity inception and termination are 
generally the same,” (2002, 14). Polity IV: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm 
5 Polity IV: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm 
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Development Program (UNDP), “PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) rates of exchange allow 
this [measure] to take account of price differences between countries. GNI per capita 
(PPP US$) accounts for price differences between countries and therefore better reflects 
people's living standards,” (UNDP, 2007). The data are available for a majority of the 
cases and come from the online WDI database of the World Bank.
6
 
As with democracy, it is not likely that economic factors will have a strong effect 
on RED.  If economics factors were a significant barrier, the most advanced industrial 
countries would have highest RED levels because they have the most available start-up 
capital.  Since this is frequently not the case, the paper expects less.  Interestingly, 
economics can also act as a proxy for the „Technology‟ arguments seen earlier.
7
  If 
technology were a barrier, the relationship would be significant, positive, and of 
moderate strength.  There are at least two significant strands of the literature draw 
attention to this relationship.  Clearly, there are reasons to believe that the relationship 
will be significant.  This paper, however, expects that each strand of the literature 
overstates the role of this variable.  It expects a weak relationship between PPP and RED. 
Third, literacy rates are used as the measure for educational factors.  While there 
are more refined measures of education, such as the Education Index of the UNDP, they 
are not available for every year of the time period in question.  Data for literacy rates are 
available for a large set of countries but only for a small number of years. Since literacy 
rates are unlikely to change dramatically over time and to minimize a loss in the number 
                                               
6 World Bank-World Development Indicators online:  
http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=6 
7 Theoretically central to many of the „Technology‟ discussions is the cost of these technologies.  Many of 
these works imply that as these technologies reach maturity, they will become cheaper and increasingly 
prevalent.  An economic indicator can therefore, albeit weakly, indicate  whether cost appears to be an 
issue.   
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of cases, the data are held constant.   The data are taken from the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and represent the 
percentage of the country‟s population that is literate.
8
 
Expectations for this variable are similar to the democracy measure.  There are 
states with very high levels of education but little investment in RED.  This suggests that 
Education makes little sense as a barrier to renewables.  Further, education does not seem 
to be grounded in the same ways that Democracy or Economics are.  It is expected that 
the relationship between REI and Education will be insignificant. 
 Finally, the variable for related infrastructure, measured here as outside sources of 
funding, comes from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank.
9
  
Volpi‟s discussion of the barriers to renewable energy development mentions how IFI 
incentives, subsidies, and available start-up finance can each act as barriers to renewable 
energy development.  While there is no variable that captures these perfectly, the World 
Bank provides a variable measuring Official Development Assistance (ODA) and 
Official Aid (in current US$).  According to the World Bank, the ODA data contain, “the 
flows of official and private financial resources from the members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) to developing Economies…” (WDI 2007).  Because the data for 
Direct Foreign Investment also come from the DAC, they are equally justifiable.  
However, the WDI take ODA data and add „official aid,‟ which includes transactions for 
which the goal is not development (ibid, 2007).  Because the incentives and subsidies for 
renewable energy can come from transactions with goals other than development, and 
                                               
8
UNESCO: http://data.un.org/Browse.aspx?d=UNESCO. Where necessary, estimates came from 
UNESCO's former literacy projection model (July 2002 Assessment). 
9 World Bank-World Development Indicators online: ibid. 
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because the availability of start-up finance more generally is important for this variable, 
this is the best indicator of related infrastructure. 
The variable is attributed a distinct role in the literature.  Volpi suggests that the 
availability of start-up capital is a significant barrier to RED.  It is expected that larger 
amounts of aid increase the potential for developing renewable energy portfolios.  The 
argument is reasonable and finds little opposition in the literature.  This paper expects 
that the coefficient for this variable will be significant and positive.  However, in 
maintaining theoretical consistency with the preceding expectations, this variable is not 
expected to carry moderate strength.  The descriptive statistics for all variables are 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
REI 1707 0.8 2.3 0 18.8 
Curvilinear 
Intervention 
1707 1437.331 1662.089 4 10000 
Intervention 1707 33.137 18.424 2 100 
Democracy 1638 3.705 6.244 -10 10 
Economics 1661 8673.365 10185.780 200 60870 
Education 1707 77.249 22.281 9.391 99.441 
Aid 1608 359000000 556000000 -959000000 6440000000 
 
Analysis 1: 
The first analysis presents of a test of the theoretical argument and evaluates 
barriers for RED emphasized in the existing literature.  Using a multiple regression 
model, the analysis tests whether the most significant international barrier to renewable 
energy development is enabling policies and regulatory frameworks.  Because investment 
in RED varies across different countries and changes over time, a time-series cross-
sectional analysis is justified.  As Babbie argues, often in social research there are 
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situations when several independent variables simultaneously affect the dependent 
variable, and, “multiple regression analysis provides a means of analyzing such 
situations” (2006, 458).  This analysis also investigates earlier work in the field 
(particularly that of Volpi) to see whether the political, economic, educational, and/or 
related infrastructural variables are significant.  The proposed analysis will help to 
illuminate which of the barriers are relevant for future work. 
Results: 
This section examines the results of the initial tests, investigating the proposed 
curvilinear relationship between government intervention and RED.  After completing 
the requisite assumptions tests and regression diagnostics for the proposed model, this 
work uses Bayesian model selection (for the regression diagnostics see Appendix A).  
While the model in question is theoretically grounded, the relative dispersion of the 
literature and “kitchen sink” nature of the control variables lead to a number of questions 
surrounding specification.  Because the sample size is large enough, Bayesian 
Information Criteria are the most appropriate way to analyze the models in question.  
The first model, the specified curvilinear model, employs REI as the dependent 
variable, the intervention variable, intervention squared (the curvilinear indicator) and the 
control variables.  The second model is a linear version of the first and excludes the 
squared term.   The third model follows the “Laundry list” approach and adds four new 
variables to Model 1, including variables for imports, exports, and regime durability.  The 
table below shows the results for each model and presents the Akaike Information 




Table 3: Model Selection: Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian Information 
Criterion 
 
Model Obs ll(null) ll(model) df AIC BIC 
Model 1 1504 3980.244 4032.85 6 -8053.7 -8021.81 
Model 2 1504 3980.244 4028.805 5 -8047.61 -8021.03 
Model 3 1504 3980.244 4040.86 10 -8061.72 -8008.56 
 
For interpretation of AIC and BIC, the best model is the one with the smallest score.  The 
results indicate is the first model is the most appropriate.  The remainder of the analyses 
will employ this model.  The results of the model for Analysis 1 can be seen in Table 4. 
R-squared is 0.078, indicating that the model accounts for 7.8% of the variation in the 
dependent variable. 
 The most important result is the significance and strength of the coefficients for 
the key independent variables.  The coefficient for the key independent variable, the 
variable estimating the curvilinear relationship, is significant at the .01 level, and carries a  
Table 4: Results of Analysis 1 




    
F(  5,  1497) = . 
    
Prob > F = . 
    
R-squared = 0.068 
    
Root MSE = 0.017 
      REI Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
t P>t Beta 
Curvilinear 
Intervention 
0.00000 0.00000 3.480 0.001 0.271 
Intervention -0.00043 0.00009 -4.940 0.000 -0.473 
Democracy 0.00039 0.00006 6.900 0.000 0.141 
Economics -0.00000 0.00000 -3.510 0.000 -0.084 
Education -0.00006 0.00003 -2.160 0.031 -0.080 
Aid 0.00000 0.00000 1.290 0.196 0.022 
_cons 0.02030 0.00341 5.950 0.000 . 
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beta weight of .27.  This relationship is inconsistent with the proposed curvilinear 
relationship, and is also of medium strength.  Figure 2 shows the effect of interventionism 
on renewable energy along with the upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence 
interval (C.I.).  This falls completely out of line with expectations and will be discussed 
more in detail in the discussion section. 
 All but one of the control variables are significant beyond the .05 level. Further, 
all but two of the variables fall in line with the theoretical expectations that guided the 
model.  The results show that each of these variables also depart from the expectations 
seen in the literature. For example, none of the control variables exhibited anything but 
 Figure 2: The Effect of Interventionism on Renewable Energy
 
weak relationships to REI.  From there, the results are not uniform, and it is best to 
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The strongest of the constants was Democracy, which was expectedly significant.  
The relationship positive and weak (a beta weight of .14).  This also falls in line with 
expectations.  Interestingly, while the literature presumably expects that each of the 
relationships will be positive, Democracy was the only variable with a positive 
coefficient. 
Moving down in strength, the next significant variable is the economic indicator.  
With a beta weight of -.084, these results also fall in line with this paper‟s expectations.  
Looking back, it did not make theoretical sense that countries like the United States who 
do well on most economic indicators would struggle so much.  As such, it did not seem to 
make sense that the barriers to RED were economic in the ways that had been suggested.  
These results show that, although the relationship is weak, there is a negative relationship 
between Economics and RED success.  This is also a drastic departure from the literature, 
and will also be discussed further. 
The next relationship exhibiting significance at the .031 level is the coefficient for 
the education indicator.  The weight of this relationship is also weak, at -.08, and falls in 
line with expectations.  Further, this indicator also indicates a polar change from the 
literature‟s expectation. 
The only insignificant control variable is the variable for aid.  This finding 
contradicts the expectations of both the literature and the theoretical development.  Volpi 
suggests that one of the largest barriers to RED is the availability of start-up capital.  The 
more development assistance and aid are available to a country, the more start-up capital 
is theoretically available.  These results are counterintuitive since they indicate that Aid is 
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irrelevant as a barrier to RED.  Possible reasons for this relationship will be discussed in 
the discussion section. 
 Taken together, the results give mixed signals for the theoretical expectations.  
The curvilinear relationship hypothesized in the theoretical section is supported 
empirically. However, it is opposite to the proposed relationship.  In addition, all but one 
of the control variables are significant.  That said, the results do not necessarily always 
fall in line with expectations.  Their significance, however, says much about the presence 
of international barriers to renewable energy development.  The most important 
relationship stemming from this analysis is a curvilinear relationship between GOE and 
RED.  At a minimum, this finding indicates that more attention should be given to 
government intervention and its effect on RED.  Among the control variables, results 
show a need to pay specific attention to each of the negative relationships.  The results 
show that economics and education do not affect RED in the way proposed in the 
literature.  In addition, the insignificance of the relationship between Aid and RED 
deserves more attention.  While a more nuanced specification of aid for RED is 
necessary, the relationship presented here warrants a need to proceed with caution. 
Analysis 2:  
While the first analysis is appropriate for a number of reasons already put 
forward, it also makes sense that differing contexts, particularly level of development, 
can influence the production of renewable energies.  The imperative for renewable 
energy development is also arguably more significant for developing countries.  As 
Martinot et al. point out, while consuming only around 30% of the available commercial 
energy, developing countries house around 80% of the world‟s population (2002, 310).  
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As the world‟s population grows and developing countries develop, so will the demand 
for energy.  To state this even more clearly, the UNDP observes that the energy 
perspective has given negligible attention to poverty, but that “… energy is central to the 
satisfaction of basic health and nutrition needs, and that energy services constitute a 
sizable share of total house expenditure in developing countries,” (2000, and as seen in 
Volpi, 2005).  Clearly, there is much at stake for the developing world when it comes to 
investing in renewable energy. 
 This recognition of the contextual differences between the levels of development 
has instigated much of the work on the subject.  Whether for sustainable development, 
liberal economic, or institutionalist reasons, there have been a number of efforts to 
develop renewable energies in the developing world.  However, several of the donor aid 
based programs designed for developing countries early on have been unsuccessful.  As 
Geller puts it, “the World Bank and bilateral donors  have at times been criticized for 
failing to build an infrastructure that is capable of marketing and supplying solar energy 
and other sources of renewable energy devices over the long run once a particular 
„development project‟ ends,” (84, see also Martinot et al. 2002, Mulugetta, Nhete and 
Jackson 2000).  Admittedly, a noteworthy debate springs from this analysis and is the 
subject of great discussion.  It is therefore worth exploring whether contextual indicators 
such as level of development affect RED. 
 The second part of this project therefore examines the proposed differences as a 
function of level of development.  The preceding passage suggests that there are clear 
differences in the ways that groups of countries harness their renewable energy 
potentials.  The literature also suggests that the path taken may depend upon the 
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country‟s level of development.  For example, developed countries have a greater variety 
of RED mechanisms at their disposal than countries at the other end of the developmental 
spectrum.  It is therefore justified to empirically evaluate how the variables employed in 
the first analysis play out at each level of development.  The second analysis will evaluate 
whether the barriers in the first analysis appear to be different based upon level of 
development and which barriers appear to be significant at each level. Finally, and more 
specifically, it will evaluate whether donor aid is statistically significant.  The second 
analysis thus adds empirical support to a number of contextually bound arguments. 
Results: 
 Countries identified by the UNDP as very highly and highly developed were 
added together.  The work then employed the same variables as the previous model for 
this group of countries.  Immediately, however, there was a problem.  The Curvilinear 
indicator was insignificant.  The analysis then ran a linear model.  A comparison of the 
results can be seen in Table 5. These results clearly differ from the first analysis.  In this 
half of countries, the significance of the curvilinear indicator drops out entirely. 
 Each model also captured 21.5% of the variation in the D.V.  While the difference 
is arguably negligible (the only difference being Interventionism), the linear model 
indicates that linear interventionism is still significant for this half.  Therefore, the linear 
model was the most appropriate way to examine the barriers to RED at this level.
10
  The 
relationship between GOE and REI is depicted in Figure 3. 
 Despite this departure, this model also exhibits a number of relationships 
consistent with the first analysis.  The work developed no specific expectations for this  
 
                                               
10 This finding was confirmed by Bayesian Model selection.   
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Table 5: The Results of the Curvilinear and Linear Models for Developed States 




 (0.000000855)  
Intervention 0.000 -7.77e-05*** 
 (0.0000781) (0.000015) 
Democracy 0.000 0.000 
 (0.0000876) (0.0000875) 
Economics 4.90e-07*** 4.90e-07*** 
 (0.0000000938) (0.0000000938) 
Education 0.000170*** 0.000168*** 
 (0.0000506) (0.0000498) 
Aid 0.000 0.000 
 0.000 0.000 
Constant -0.0157*** -0.0152*** 
 (0.00457) (0.00412) 
Observations 725.000 725.000 
R-squared 0.215 0.215 
 Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
   
 
division of development.  Nonetheless, it is not necessary for this half to cover the entire 
range of observations that guide the theoretical development.  For example, it is rather 
unsurprising that the significance of Democracy drops out entirely. There is no reason to 
expect this indicator to hold at this level.  This makes sense because the examples leading 
the countervailing theoretical development are found in this half.  That said, it is worth 
pointing out that there are still similarities between models. 
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Figure 3: The Effect of Interventionism on Renewable Energy 
 
  The most immediate similarity is that the Aid variable is still insignificant.  
Further, the education variable is still significant.  Still of weak strength, the relationship 
between REI and Education becomes positive.  Interestingly, this falls much more in line 
with the expectations of the literature.  It does not even necessarily contradict the 
theoretical development, which expected that, if significant, the relationship would only 
be of weak strength. 
The strongest finding for this half of the analysis, the Economic indicator, carries 
the largest beta weight at this level.  In fact, it is significant, positive, and of moderate 
strength (significant beyond the .001 level the beta weight is .392).  This finding is 
completely inconsistent with the first analysis and the results are puzzling.  Logically, it 
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especially true for this half of the developmental spectrum.  The more start-up capital a 
state has, the more likely it is that they will be able to develop a portfolio of renewable 
energy. Before discussing this point much further, however, it is important to see the 
results for less-developed countries. 
 The same variables were included in an analysis of countries identified as 
exhibiting medium and low levels of human development.  Due to the results of the 
previous analysis, the work ran both the curvilinear and linear models examining the 
barriers to RED.  These results show a direct and immediate departure from the model 
examining the top half.  Most importantly, the curvilinear relationship is significant at 
this level. The results are shown in Table 6.  The model captures 7.2% of the variation in 
the D.V. and the results show that the relationship between Intervention and REI is 
significant for both the curvilinear and linear indicators.  What is surprising is that the 
model exhibits a different relationship than seen up to this point.  This is best seen in 
Figure 4. 
 This finding raises some questions for the theoretical argument.  The curvilinear 
hypothesis expected that too much intervention would ultimately hinder RED.  It is 
puzzling that RED increases at the ends of the interventionist spectrum.  Further, 








Table 6: The Results of the Curvilinear and Linear Models for Developing States 
 




 (0.00000175)  
Interventionism -0.000684*** -0.000254*** 
 (0.000196) (0.0000396) 
Democracy 0.000536*** 0.000531*** 
 (0.000117) (0.000118) 
Economics 0.000 1.05e-06* 
 (0.000000626) (0.000000611) 
Education 0.000 0.000 
 (0.0000385) (0.000039) 
Aid -0* -0** 
 0 0 
Constant 0.0255*** 0.0170*** 
 (0.00559) (0.00373) 
   
Observations 844 844 
R-squared 0.072 0.066 
 Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Before attempting to discuss these results, it is important to pay attention to the control 
variables. 
 The findings for the control variables are mostly opposite to those in the first half. 
Variables that were significant in the first, such as economics and education, are now 
insignificant.  Those that were insignificant, Democracy and Aid, are significant in this 
model.  When combined with the departures of the first half with the larger model, the  
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Figure 4: The Effect of Interventionism on Renewable Energy
 
 
change in results is unsurprising. However, the specific results do contribute a number of 
interesting findings. 
 Looking back, many of the proposed barriers were informed by an evaluation of 
the developing world.  What is striking is that all but one of these barriers depart from the 
literature.  Democracy is significant and positive for these levels.  Looking back, it was 
also the strongest relationship of the control variables in the international analysis.  Its 
relative strength does not meet the literature‟s expectations, but it is the closest these 
variables get to describing the barriers to RED. 
The strangest departures from the developmentally informed literature are 
economics and education.  The economic variable is no longer significant.  The same is 
true for the educational indicator.  Again, this is opposite to findings in the first half of 
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guided the second analysis is Aid.  It is only at this level that it becomes significant.  
Theoretically, more Aid would mean more available start-up capital.  However, the 
relationship does all but confirm expectations because the coefficient is negative and the 
relationship is weak.  Clearly there are a number of puzzling findings, and they will be 
discussed in greater detail in the discussion section. 
 Taken together, the second analysis highlights important differences from the first 
analysis.  There clearly seem to be differences based upon level of development.  
However, most of these results stand in direct contrast to the expectations stemming from 
the literature.  The only finding that fell completely outside of expectations was that of 
the hypothesized relationship.  In every analysis, the results run counter to both a broader 
literature and to the theoretical development of this work.  It is therefore important to 
briefly examine this relationship under an analytical light before discussing the findings. 
Analysis 3: 
 What is it about the relationship between GOE and REI that is so peculiar?  The 
answer to this question is beyond the scope of this project.  However, there do seem to be 
multiple lines of evidence that point the researcher in the right direction.  Looking back, 
there are number of areas of uncertainty surrounding enabling policies and regulatory 
frameworks.  While theoretically grounded, there are a number of practical problems that 
are much more significant than expected. 
First and foremost, as seen earlier, there is a problem of specification.  The 
theoretical development hypothesizes that the relationship between enabling policies and 
regulatory frameworks is curvilinear.  There are no specified variables for renewable 
enabling policies and regulatory frameworks.  In operationalizing this variable, it was 
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necessary to assume that these policies and frameworks can be proxied as interventions.  
The work then employed the best possible measure of government interventionism which 
can be argued to be suspect.  However, it is not yet necessary to reject either the 
hypothesized relationship or the analysis since problems could also lie in the GOE 
variable employed.  If one can show that it is the GOE variable that is to blame, the larger 
theoretical development may remain intact. 
This work was clear on the weaknesses of the GOE measure.  The literature, 
however, suggests that it is the best proxy to date and it therefore makes sense to employ 
it.  However, the variable is much more suspect than the literature suggests.  In taking a 
closer look at the data, there are a number of problems.  First and foremost, the data come 
from at least two different sources.  This work did observe this from the start, but it 
appears more problematic than originally anticipated.  Problems with the data were clear  
early on, and can be seen in Table 7.  Data on GOE change dramatically between 2002 
and 2003.  In clarifying the problem, I e-mailed the creators of this dataset for  
 
Table 7: Problematic Data 
 
Year Australia Austria Belgium Denmark 
1990 25.2 42.0 27.0 20.3 
1995 21.5 42.0 27.0 24.9 
2000 21.5 42.0 11.9 24.9 
2001 21.5 42.0 14.9 24.9 
2002 21.5 42.0 20.6 24.9 
2003 8.6 5.4 8.7 8.1 
2004 8.6 5.1 8.0 9.1 
2005 8.9 5.4 8.5 8.6 




clarification.  The creators made it clear that the project was in the process of switching 
data sources.  The larger project, it was argued, had made an attempt at incorporating data 
from a single source as much as possible.  They even provided a dataset with all of the 
data taken from a single source.  Armed with the dataset and, again, the usage of the 
dataset in the larger literature, the analysis proceeded. 
 However, it is clear that the data are more problematic than anticipated.  As an 
initial test, this analysis examined the international data for a four year period on either 
side of the apparent problem.  The results are illustrative. Looking at the means from 
each period tells a peculiar story.  In fact, the changes between these two periods for 
GOE are counterintuitive.  While one would expect changes, it seems reasonable that 
they would be consistent across variables.  In looking at the percentage of change in the 
means between periods, the results are seen in Table 9.  Not only is the change in GOE 
twice that of the other variables, but it is also change in the opposite direction.  This is  









potentially problematic.  There appear to be no actual changes at the international level 
that would explain such a result. 
 Even if one were to allow for drastic global changes of this nature, there are still 
problems.  The data come from at least two different places.  For some of these countries, 
the data come from a single source and are uniform.  For other countries, there is no 
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telling exactly where the data come from.  This would be more acceptable if the data 
from a single source and the more problematic data were evenly distributed.  However, it 
is not.  Looking at the UNDP HDI rankings, the countries represented by the data from a 
single source are remarkably uneven.  The data representation can be seen in the 
following table. 
Table 10: Percentage of Countries Represented in Data From a Single Source by 




High Medium Low 
Countries 
Represented 
8% 33% 51% 83% 
 
Undoubtedly, this is far too uneven.  The reliable data, the data from a single source, even 
represents 63% of the countries without renewables as compared to 45% of those with.  
This gap is far too great. 
 Ultimately, this suggests that however popular in the literature, the data for GOE 
is problematic when looking at the international level.  The accurate data highly favors 
developing countries.  As Australia, Austria, Belgium and Denmark illustrate, this may 
also strongly favor a negative relationship between REI and GOE. 
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Figure 5: GOE by Year for Examples of Problematic Data
 
Figure 6: REI by Year for Examples of Problematic Data
 
These figures show how much the problematic data can influence the proposed 
relationship.  The two sources certainly increase the strength of the negative relationship. 













































 The lesson, for this work, is that the relationship between REI and GOE coming 
from Analysis One and Two is suspect.  While they initially seemed to challenge the 
proposed hypothesis, the data unduly favor contradictory results for both Interventionism 
and Curvilinear Interventionism.  The results, then, neither confirm nor refute the 
hypothesis.  Until better data are specified and the empirical relationship is examined 
further, the hypothesis remains tenable. 
 
Discussion: 
The results of these analyses are mixed.  Some of them fall directly line with 
expectations.  Others are far from what was expected and deserve more attention.  For 
obvious reasons, the results for both Interventionism and Curvilinear Interventionism will 
largely be left out of this analysis.  Nonetheless, the findings surrounding the control 
variables are telling.  This section will start by discussing the findings of each analysis 
and the expectations that had been developed for each. Where findings were 
unanticipated, the discussion will attempt to evaluate the logic and empirical reality of 
each finding to make sense of conflicting results.  From there, this discussion will bring 
in outside work that may increase our understanding. 
 The first analysis largely followed expectations.  It is important to make specific 
note of the fact that Bayesian Model selection confirms the choice of model.  Not only 
does this help to validate the theoretical development to some degree, but it also confirms 
the inclinations of those that employed a kitchen sink strategy in approaching the barriers 
to renewable energy development.  Within the confines of this study, the best model was 
the model that expected that the relationship between RED and Intervention was 
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curvilinear, and included the political, economic, educational, and related infrastructural 
indicators. 
The results of the first analysis also help corroborate the theoretically driven 
expectations of this work.  Starting with the strongest of the control variables, Democracy 
was significant, positive, and of weak strength.   The literature would seem to suggest 
that this relationship should be stronger, but this work expected otherwise.  What this 
suggests is that at the international level, the political constant has a steady, yet relat ively 
weak effect upon RED.  Peculiarly, this relationship was the only positive relationship at 
this level of analysis.  While renewable energy may make theoretical sense for all sorts of 
political systems, it is those that are more democratic that tend to be doing better in 
general.  That said, there are still questions as to how endogenous and/or exogenous 
political variables affect RED, and it is prudent to rely upon the common academic 
refrain, „More research along these lines is necessary.‟ 
The most counterintuitive result coming from the first analysis was that of the 
Economic variable.  As discussed briefly, the apparent divergence of this variable from 
the literature causes some dissonance.  Looking back, the same logic that informed the 
expectations about Democracy was also expected to hold for Economics.  It makes little 
immediate sense why the direction of this variable would seem to stand in direct contrast.  
This also stands in direct contrast to the literature.  Countries with higher PPP‟s are doing 
worse at developing renewable energy.  This work expected a weak relationship, but this 
result is counterintuitive.  The expectations were built upon the logic of countries that 
should be doing well, but were not.  These expectations, however, would not have taken 
it this far.  This also casts light upon the cost reliant technological discourse.  It is 
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important, in this light, to examine how this plays out based upon level of development.  
Before doing so, however, there is one final control variable in need of discussion at this 
level. 
The final variable significant internationally was Education.  The result, a 
negative and weak relationship, shows that a country‟s level of education has little to do 
with REI.  In these cases, although the indicator is significant, is has less to do with 
renewable development that the literature anticipates.  This finding follows the 
expectations of this work, and falls in line with the economic findings.  These results also 
fall contrary to those of Democracy, and it is to the second analysis that the discussion 
turns for clarification. 
The second analysis, born out of the more „context specific‟ strand of literature, 
started by dividing the world in half according to the UNDP‟s Human Development 
Rankings.  Developed States were those countries identified by the UNPD as exhibiting 
“Very High” and “High” levels of human development, and Developing States were 
those identified with “Medium” and “Low” levels.  There were no expectations set 
particularly for these levels.  The results are mixed in a number of ways.  Yet, there was 
actually more here than anticipated. 
 The results coming from Developed States are relatively straightforward.  The 
results of the same linear model employed earlier are see in Table 11. While this work‟s 
initial expectations were for the group of countries as a whole, it is fascinating that this 
model varies so much from the first analysis.  Of the control variables, the only 
completely consistent result was Aid.  This is a relatively benign finding, however, 
because the result was insignificant in each model.  Further, this half contains the OECD  
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Table 11: Results of Linear Interventionism for Developed States 
    Number of 
obs = 
725 
    F(  4,   719) = . 
    Prob > F = . 
    R-squared = 0.2148 
    Root MSE = 0.01216 
      
REI Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
t P>t Beta 
Intervention -0.000078 0.000015 -5.170 0.000 -0.093 
Democracy -0.000042 0.000088 -0.480 0.634 -0.017 
Economics 0.000000 0.000000 5.220 0.000 0.392 
Education 0.000168 0.000050 3.380 0.001 0.089 
Aid 0.000000 0.000000 -1.220 0.223 -0.024 
_cons -0.015186 0.004120 -3.690 0.000 . 
 
countries that provide the developmental assistance and aid.  From there, however, the 
results become increasingly significant. 
The Economic variable, to start, in and of itself constitutes a significant finding.  
First, Economics carried the largest beta weight in Developed States (a 0.392 which 
indicates moderate strength).  As such, it stands to reason that for these countries, the 
largest barrier to RED is Economics.  Not only does this fall opposite the findings of 
Analysis 1, but it seems to make the relationship even more complex.  The logic of the 
literature suggests that this relationship indicates a barrier.  The countries that the UNDP 
reports as doing the “best” at human development support a remarkably strong positive 
relationship.  This finding, then, leads to two questions: 1) Is a positive relationship a 
barrier; and 2) How can a variable with a negative coefficient in the first analysis be 
positive at this level? 
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The answer to the first question is no; a positive relationship at this level does not 
indicate a barrier.  The results show that the higher the level of PPP, the better a country 
in this half will do at developing renewables.  For these levels of development, 
economics is everything but a barrier.  As countries in this half do better economically, 
they also produce more renewables.  What is astonishing is that at this level, the results 
also fall completely in line with the expectations of the literature.  How can economics be 
significant, positive, of moderate strength and a barrier?  Clearly, the literature was 
looking at developing countries when arguing that economics was a barrier.  The point, 
for now, is that a positive relationship for this half indicates a very different relationship 
than a positive relationship expected at a lower level of development. 
The answer to the second question is less straightforward.  There are countries in 
this half, as seen in the case of the United States, that are doing poorly.  As such, the 
strength of this relationship falls considerably out of line with the theoretical expectations 
of this work.  When looking at specific countries in this half, however, the explanation 
becomes clearer.  The countries that are doing the worst in this half are Kuwait, United 
Arab Emirates, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.  Not only do these countries rank 
lower on the UNDP scale, but they also have consistently lower levels of PPP than the 
countries that are doing the best in this half.  Their reason for doing so poorly with 
renewables, however, has little to do with economic means.  These cases produce a 
significant percentage of the world‟s oil and have less of an immediate imperative for 
renewable development.  Clearly, the effect of these countries provides a reasonable 
explanation for the strength of the results.  In the light of these two explanations, it is 
important to turn to the results of the second half. 
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The results for Developing States also provided the researcher with more than 
expected.  The results of the curvilinear model seen earlier are: 
Table 12: Results of Curvilinear Interventionism for Developing States 




    
F(  5,   837) = . 
    
Prob > F = . 
    
R-squared = 0.0715 
    
Root MSE = 0.0282 
      REI Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>t Beta 
Curvilinear 
Intervention 
0.000004 0.000002 2.550 0.011 0.281 
Intervention -
0.000684 
0.000196 -3.490 0.001 -0.435 
Democracy 0.000536 0.000117 4.580 0.000 0.106 
Economics 0.000001 0.000001 1.560 0.118 0.073 
Education 0.000005 0.000039 0.120 0.907 0.003 
Aid 0.000000 0.000000 -1.930 0.055 -0.038 
_cons 0.025483 0.005586 4.560 0.000 . 
 
The results of Developing States are largely opposite those in Developed States.  This is 
reasonable.  Again, it makes no sense that each half contains the entire range of 
observations from which the expectations for the whole were derived.  That said, this half 
also show a number of surprising results. 
Looking first at the variable for Aid, this is the only model in which this indicator 
is significant.  The strength of the relationship is undeniably weak and negative.  The 
literature, however, expected that Aid would be a bear a positive relationship of moderate 
strength to RED.  It makes intuitive sense that the more Aid a country receives, the more 
start-up capital would be available to them.  Clearly, these results were negative.  What, 
then, does availability of start-up capital in the form of PPP say for this analysis? 
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In light of the previous discussion, the results for economics are also surprising. 
The variable is insignificant at this level.  This is remarkable considering the results of 
the first analysis and those of the other half.  Increases in PPP would also suggest a 
greater availability of start-up capital.  Its insignificance, therefore, gives mixed signals.  
Like Developed States, however, Developing States contains a number of oil producing 
nations.  Unlike Developed States, countries like Iran and Nigeria exhibit higher levels of 
Human Development than many of the other countries in this half of the data.  While the 
result is interesting, there are few oil producers on this list.  When looking at the data, 
there are an entirely different group of countries that compel the second half of this 
explanation. 
In retrospect, many of the countries found in the list of countries without REI in 
2006 belong to Developing States.  Further, three of the members of the Top 10 fall in 
this half (Benin, Philippines, and Kenya).  The most poignant example, Benin, ranked 
Number One in REI in 2006.  Benin, however, can be found near the bottom of the 
UNDP‟s list.  When combined, the presence of oil producers, the overarching general 
lack of renewables in Developing States, and three members in the top ten combine to 
provide a much more reasonable explanation that previously though.  However, when 
combined with Aid, it is clear that a more in depth discussion is necessary. 
There are actually a number of possible explanations for these findings to contrast 
so greatly with the earlier analyses.  The first follows the logic of the economic barriers 
to RED.  While this particular analysis saw divergent results, logic suggests that there is 
an unidentified level of Economics at which renewables make sense. It also makes sense 
that the countries that are receiving the most Aid are the least developed.   Could it be 
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that the countries receiving the most Aid have yet to reach a level at which they can begin 
to develop renewables?  Unfortunately, this answer would require a full analysis of the 
reasons for which OECD countries give specific countries Development Assistance and 
Aid, and is beyond the scope of this research 
Those familiar with the topic, however, need little imagination to tie this into the 
second reason.  This half, the less developed, is the subject of a great body of literature.  
This literature provides insight into these results in a number of ways.  First, there are a 
number of questions in the literature that surround the success of Aid. In fact, a number 
of scholars question whether it actually leads to Economic Development.  If Aid does not 
lead to development, these results make much more sense.  Theoretically, if Aid fails to 
get countries to a level at which they can begin to develop their renewable energy 
potentials, it even makes some sense that this relationship would be negative. 
 This literature sheds light on both findings.  For example, some of the Aid given 
comes with strings attached.  Seen most often in the criticisms of the Structural 
Adjustment loans of the World Bank, loans have routinely been given with „conditions.‟  
This literature is vast, but it is worth a quick examination.  In doing so, however, it is 
important to take a brief step back.  While this paper is ultimately about renewable 
energies, the literature provides insight into both the Economic and Aid puzzles seen in 
this half of the results. It is therefore important to start with the broader discussion 
surrounding the effects of international liberalization. 
The liberalization of trade and finance has increased the level of competition in a 
number of places.  The effects of liberalization are the subject of a large body of 
literature.  Underhill, for example, observes that transnational interests can 
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advantageously structure markets through a systematic capture of the policy process 
(1998, 18-25). In a more recent study, Underhill argues, “Under conditions of 
transnational integration, the monetary and financial system (and its associated national 
entities) will be structured largely along the lines of the way in which the provision of 
credit is created, allocated, and regulated in dominant financial centers...” (2001, 278).  
Combined, these lead him to show both how much pressure this can put on a particular 
economic system, and that there is little neutrality in shaping the infrastructure of that 
system through both practice and the policy process (ibid, 278). 
In general, restructuring economies takes time.  Undue pressures can complicate 
the process.  In terms of OECD, then, what can be said?  The Official Development 
Assistance and Aid of OECD members can be differentiated from the Structural 
Adjustment loans of the World Bank.  However, these processes affect the markets in 
question.  Lockhart observes that contradictory outcomes have created concerns around, 
“… a lack of coherence between aid, trade, finance, security, immigration and drugs 
policy,” and that, “it is impossible to achieve certain policy goals without mobilizing a 
range of complimentary policies,” (2005, 1). 
The OECD is also far from neutral.  The Policy Coherence for Development 
(PCD) and Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)(which ultimately generated 
catastrophic opposition) are just two examples.  The PCD sought the integration of the 
agenda for aid with agendas for the integration for trade, security, and private sector 
investment (see Lockhart).  The MAI, though failed, would have required all countries to 
open  foreign investment and ownership, the equality of treatment for international and 
domestic firm, the removal of performance requirements, the unrestricted movement of 
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capital, etc. (for more, see Dicken, 2007, 537). OECD policies are hemispheric in nature, 
and many agree that they unfairly privilege Transnational Corporations (TNCs) over 
domestic businesses. 
There are also a number of works questioning the effectiveness of Aid itself.  For 
example, Ovaska finds that “…the results from the fixed effect (FE) model with group 
dummy variables and period effects indicated a negative relationship between 
development aid and economic growth,” (italics in original, 2003, 186, see also Boone, 
1996).  While a number of studies on the topic find diverging results (see, for example, 
Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp, 2000 and Burnside and Dollar, Hansen an Tarp 2001), even 
those that find  positive relationship note that their results are sensitive to both 
econometric model selection and choice of regressors (Ovaska, 2003, 177).  As such, it 
appears safe to say that Aid does less for economic development than originally 
anticipated. 
Clearly, global market and finance liberalization, the influence of biased 
institutions, and the general lack of Aid successes bear a number of influences upon the 
economic development in any country in Developing States.  These forces also begin to 
shed some light upon the renewable context.  In returning to a telling observation of the 
assistance given by IFI and donor states, Geller notes that, “the World Bank and bilateral 
donors have at times been criticized for failing to build an infrastructure that is capable of 
marketing and supplying solar energy and other sources of renewable energy devices 
over the long run once a particular “development project” ends,” (84, see also Martinot et 




For now, it is sufficient to say that the success of renewable energies, already at a 
competitive disadvantage, is further complicated by a number of exogenous forces.  
These forces manifest themselves in a number of different ways.  Ultimately, this 
suggests that the success of renewables can be impaired in a great variety of ways when 
dealing specifically with the countries in Developing States.  Further, this helps to 
explain why the contradictory findings of both Economics and Aid are evident at this 
level.  It may not be a satisfactory refrain, but one is left concluding that more research 
along these lines is certainly necessary. 
There is one final relationship from this half in need of discussion.  Democracy, 
significant at the .001 level, was also the strongest variable in this half.  This is opposite 
the insignificance found in the first half, but falls completely in line with both the 
expectations of the literature and those of the theoretical development of this work.  For 
this half, the more democratic the country, the better they will do at developing REI. 
Democracy, it seems, is the closest to describing a barrier at this level. 
In the end, the second analysis does seem to empirically confirm the contextually 
bound discussions seen in the literature. For example, the level of development matters 
for Developing States.  Most clearly seen in the discrepancies between the results for the 
Economic indicators in each half, the results were almost contradictory.  The same can be 
said for aid.  In moving forward with this research, however, it is important to exercise 
caution. 
In these cases, as the analysis disaggregated the data, the results changed.  This 
was to be expected.  However, the justifications for the divergent results poignantly 
illustrate the problem.  In the case of the Economic indicator, the contrasting results left 
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the discussion with changing expectations and divergent results.  Further, the 
discrepancies in these results really began to make sense only when looking at the effects 
of individual countries.  The justifications for these results were ultimately grounded in 
the effects specific countries have upon those results.  Admittedly, the motivation for 
more context specific understandings may be inherently motivated by the quest for more 
ideographic knowledge.  However, the move away from nomothetic understanding 
ultimately gives the student of the international barriers less and less to work with. 
 There is one final point mentioned earlier that is in need of further discussion.  
Looking back, it was clear that economics was supposed to be a barrier to RED.  This 
was not the case for the more developed countries.  It was positive and significant. 
Because they are doing better, the relationship did not indicate a barrier. What this means 
is simple: the way one interprets the barriers to RED depends upon countries‟ standing.  
A negative relationship for developed countries is a barrier, while a positive relationship 
for the developing tells the same story.  Because these variables play out differently at 
different levels of development, the implications are contingent upon development. 
In tying the results together, a pattern emerges.  In fact, the international analysis 
appears to tell differing levels of development most of what they need to know.  One can 
predict, with relative certainty, whether a particular barrier will be of interest to a level of 
development.  Armed with the expectations for that level, the level‟s respective position 
on a variable and the international result, one can largely predict whether a variable is of 
any importance.  For example, if the expectation is positive, the group of countries is 
doing well, and the international relationship is significant and positive, it is unlikely that 
the variable will be a barrier.  This is best described in the following chart: 
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When broken apart by variable, the international analysis should show whether there is a 
need to look further.  If a barrier is possible, the results and expectations are telling.  
There is no need to rely upon a dataset with decreasing sample sizes and increasing 
uncertainty. 
Turning to the results, does this flow chart accurately describe patterns in the 
data?  Economics is a telling case.  At the international level, the relationship is 
significant and negative.  For a country this is doing well, at a level for which the 
expectation is positive, the results would be either insignificant or if significant positive.  
This level should not expect that this is a barrier.  The results actually confirm this.  The 
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Relationship between REI and Economics for Developed States are positive.  Economics 
do not act as a barrier for countries at this level of development.   For a developing 
country, however, the international result is of considerably more interest.  Interestingly, 
for this level, a barrier is expected be positive.  While the variable is insignificant at this 
level, both ultimately show that economics do not act as barriers at this level.  Following 
the flowchart logically would have led one to the same conclusion. 
 These patterns are actually quite significant.  It is therefore worth discussing each 
variable in turn.  Following the logic solely, what would the findings for Democracy 
suggest for countries on opposite ends of the political spectrum?  For an advanced 
democracy, there would be no need to concern themselves with the findings.  They are 
doing well on the variable, a positive relationship is not a barrier, and this variable would 
be of no interest.  If significant, they would expect a positive relationship at this level.  
For a more autocratic regime, however, a positive relationship and expectation signals a 
barrier and is of particular interest.  Admittedly, the halves were not divided along 
political lines and the test is imperfect.  However, the aggregates ideologies of these 
halves seem to confirm this logic.  When looking at the results, Democracy is 
insignificant for those in Developed States and a barrier in Developing States. 
 Education, then, is the next test.  Again, following the logic, countries that have 
sophisticated levels of education would not need to look at this barrier, and the 
relationship should be positive if significant.  This particular finding would be of interest 
to countries that are not doing well, because it is negative.  For Developed States the 




 The final variable, Aid, also falls in line.  Due to its insignificance, it would not 
logically appear to be a barrier at any level.  In fact, as the analysis largely suggests, Aid 
does not appear to be a barrier to RED at any level.  The variable is only significant for 
Developing States, and a negative relationship indicates that the Aid has an effect on REI 
opposite that proposed in the literature. 
Within this framework, the international analysis can be very telling. Different 
countries will interpret the result differently.  While disaggregating the data seems 
justified, it is not necessary.  The results of this study show that the international analysis 
is all the evidence necessary.  Depending upon relative position at each variable, one can 
find what they need to know without breaking the dataset down.  Further tests of this 
framework may be necessary.  For now, however, this should be the basis from which 
any discussion of the international barriers to renewable energy development proceeds. 
While there are certainly contextual differences and the barriers specific countries will 
face will vary, the larger model does much more than anticipated.  Once scholars allow 
for different expectations, the results of one model processed through this framework are 
consistent with the disaggregated results.  That said it is still unclear how interventionism 










The results of these analyses tell a number of interesting stories.  They also lead to 
a number of conclusions with increasing specificity.  The first story is that the empirical 
approach to the barriers to renewable energy is entirely plausible.  This research shows 
that when looking at the international level, there are significant variables influencing 
RED.  The theoretically derived model also entertains support.  Empirically, it makes 
sense to talk about the international barriers to renewable energy development.  In the 
future, however, it is clear that improved specification is necessary. 
 Relatedly, the second lesson is that the largest barriers to renewable energy 
development may still be enabling policies and regulatory frameworks.  However 
problematic, the interventionism variable (in either its‟ linear or curvilinear form) was 
significant in every analysis and Bayesian Model selection.  At the very least, this work 
indicates that the relationship between enabling policies and regulatory frameworks and 
RED is especially interesting.  While the hypothesized relationship found little support 
here, it remains largely tenable. 
The third result is that GOE is woefully inadequate.  There are problems with 
these data. The distribution of the data from a single source and the data from which the 
source is inconsistent seem to favor a negative relationship between REI and GOE.  This 
favor is unjust, and the data may potentially magnify the impacts of this data.  Future 
research on this and other topics should exercise appropriate caution when dealing with 
this data. 
Fourth, looking at the international level tells a number of stories.  Primarily, 
democracy is of special importance.  There is a significant and positive relationship 
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between democracy and RED, and the political barriers to renewable energy development 
are worth further research. Economics is also significant and negative.  At this level, this 
also leaves the cost-based technological discussions as suspect.  In going forward, there is 
a need to examine these relationships more closely. 
Finally, the barriers to renewable energy do seem to depend upon the level of 
development.  In fact, this is especially true of the way that they are discussed and 
hypothesized.  When talking about the international barriers to RED, which variables are 
important to a particular country depends upon its level of development.  A country that 
is doing poorly will look at a positive relationship between PPP and REI differently than 
a country that is doing well.  A positive expectation for the developed world is 
fundamentally different than a positive relationship for the developing.  This is not to say 
that there are not international barriers. In fact, the framework shows the opposite.  From 
within this framework, one can generally predict which barriers will be significant for 
different levels of development as long as the expectations of what constitutes a barrier at 
that level are appropriate.  While there are certainly areas of grey in the middle, this 
framework gives the current literature a theoretical boost based upon empirical grounds. 
 There are, admittedly, a number of other questions for research that this work 
brings to the fore.  While further specification is undoubtedly necessary, these analyses 
stand as an important first step.  Additionally, these analyses were largely guided by both 
the extant literature and the available data.  In moving forward, there are at least two 
areas that appear increasingly relevant to any discussion of the international barriers to 
renewable energy development. 
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First, it is clear that many countries are starting to use a new approach to 
renewable energy development.  As Komor notes, “A growing number of countries are 
using a very simple approach to get new renewable capacity built: They are setting a 
mandatory goal for renewable content and letting the market find the least expensive way 
to get there,” (2004, 156).  This approach, a renewable portfolio standard (RPS, also 
called renewable obligation and quota), has political support and is favorable for both 
proponents of the free market and of renewable advocates who find clear goals amiable.  
While only 25 countries have adopted RPS‟s by 2005, further empirical research along 
these lines will become increasingly relevant. 
 Second, there is also something interesting about the flows of investment 
surrounding renewable energy.  While renewable energy investment globally was around 
US$ 7 billion in 1995, it has grown steadily (Ren21, 2005, 14).  By 2004, this amount 
totaled around US$30 billion and was around 20-25% of the total power sector 
investment that year with $150 billion going to conventional power sector investment 
(Ren21, 2005, 14).  Investments have increased quite drastically in recent years, and in 
2008 global renewable energy investment was over four times that of 2004 (UNEP, 2009, 
see also Ren 21, 2007 and 2009).  While these increases in investment are encouraging, 
especially for advocates of renewable energies, the recent and significant rates of 
sustainable energy investment growth seem to have been slowed by the current global 
financial crisis.  According to the United Nations Environment Program (UDEP), for 
example, “In the first quarter of 2009, new financial investment fell by 53% to $13.3 
billion compared to the same period in 2008, the lowest level of quarterly investment for 
three years,” (2009, 3).  While future work will undoubtedly be able to tell us more, it 
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seems unjust to speculate what this means for sustainable or conventional energy 
investment. 
The analysis also highlighted that despite the perceived irrelevance of the 
„technology‟ debate, renewables are still at a competitive disadvantage.  While the 
discrepancies between renewable energy investment and conventional energy investment 
have narrowed, the current economic climate gives no clear indication as to the 
trajectories that investment will follow.  It is, admittedly, unfortunate that this analysis 
cannot take into account the years in which investment has been at the highest.  However, 
it does seem that any trends that are observed in 2005, while the investment was 
increasing, should hold.  As such, further empirical research along these lines may also 
be necessary. 
 The future for international renewable energy development is far from certain.  
There are a number of questions that remain and the volatility of the global financial 
context complicates matters considerably.  That said, renewables are ever more viable, 
are increasingly seen as one solution to a number of problems, receive increasing 
normative favor.  The future, thus, looks bright, and even more so for developing nations.  
As Volpi suggests in a hopeful summary, “In [developing] countries, renewables are most 
often the most economical choice in rural areas – where it would be too costly to bring in 
the grid- while simultaneously offering a clean „leap‟ over fossil fuels.  Their modular 
nature and distribution mean that they can be built (and paid for) as demand for energy 
grows… Finally, renewables offer direct environmental benefits, in terms of improved 
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Appendix A:  
 
To begin the analyses, this work tested the curvilinear relationship. Undertaken to 
examine whether the analysis should proceed further, the results indicated that the model 
was significant and worth further exploration.  After entering all of the variables in the 
model, this work set about evaluating the regression hypotheses.  The results of the initial 
model were: 





Model 0.030 6.000 0.005 
 
F(  6,  1497) = 18.080 
Residual 0.413 1497.000 0.000 
 
Prob > F = 0.000 
Total 0.443 1503.000 0.000 
 
R-squared = 0.068 




     
Root MSE = 0.017 
       reinohyd Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Beta 
 Curvilinear 
Intervention 
0.000 0.000 2.840 0.005 0.271 
 Intervention 0.000 0.000 -4.800 0.000 -0.473 
 Democracy 0.000 0.000 4.950 0.000 0.141 
 Economics 0.000 0.000 -2.640 0.008 -0.084 
 Education 0.000 0.000 -2.480 0.013 -0.080 
 Aid  0.000 0.000 0.820 0.414 0.022 
 _cons 0.020 0.003 7.680 0.000 . 
  
The model was significant.   
The project then examined the distribution of the dependent variable.  The 
variable was not normally distributed.  This is unsurprising because, as seen earlier, there 
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are few countries that are successfully developing renewable energy portfolios.  As such, 
it does not come as a shock that most of the observations exhibit low levels of RED.   
The project moved on to evaluate the normality of the D.V.  Understandably, REI was 
positively skewed (4.92).  It was also clear that, with a Kurtosis of 31.87 (normal being 
3.0), the tails were very thick.   
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Std. Dev. 0.023066 
75% 0.002341 0.183009 
   90% 0.022271 0.183404 
 
Variance 0.000532 
95% 0.050318 0.184465 
 
Skewness 4.922522 




In order to tell the significance of these coefficients, this work tested Skewness/Kurtosis 
normality.  The results were as follows: 
Variable Obs    Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
REI 1700 0.000 0.000  . . 
 
When combined with the above summary, this indicates that Skewness = 4.92, p < 0.001 
and Kurtosis = 31.87, p < 0.001.  Jointly, they exhibit a probability of p < 0.001 
indicating that the distribution is not normal, the results are positively skewed, and the 
tails are thick. 
This analysis then went on to evaluate the distribution of the residuals.  Here is a 
scattergram of the regression line with a sample of 100:
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11 This was done by running the regression, predicting reihat (a score for each observation based upon the 






Due to the distribution, skew, and an analysis of the residuals, it was exceedingly clear 
that the data were problematic and needed to be transformed.  However, there was a 
problem. Because REI is a percentage from 0 to 1, the common transformation 
procedures do little to normalize the data.  For example, taking the natural log (after 
adding a constant requisite for numbers between 0 and 1) did not shift the Skew nor 
Kurtosis in any meaningful way.  This work attempted a series of log transformations 
(natural log and log(10)), square root, inverse and arc-sine transformations.  The most 
















but found nothing helpful. In the end, none of these transformations worked, and the 
remainder employs Robust Standard Estimates (RSE) to compensate for the irregularity.   
The analysis then ran diagnostic tests.  In searching for unpredictable cases, the 
analysis employed post estimation commands.
12
 The results indicate that there are no 
outliers or influential cases (dfbeta).  There are no problematic observations.   
 The final diagnostic was a test of multicollinearity.  In testing multicollinearity, 
the analysis then calculated the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).  Unsurprisingly, the two 
variables that were highly correlated were GOE and the squared variable for assessing the 
collinear relationship.  When either variable was dropped from the regression equation 
the results indicated no multicollinearlity.  Here are the results: 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 




Education 1.67 0.597 
Economics 1.62 0.619 
Democracy 1.3 0.767 
Aid 1.18 0.848 
Mean VIF 6  
 
This indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem for this analysis. 
Finally, the work tested the validity of REI as the D.V.  The best way to do this 
was to evaluate each arm of REI separately.  The work ran the specified model for both 
renewable energy as a percent of total energy production and renewable energy as a 
                                               
12 Done by predicting yhat, resid, rstandard, and the listing the results for which all of the cases for which 




percentage of total energy consumption.  The results of each were remarkably close to 
those of the entire model.  Therefore, using REI as an average of the two did not affect 
the results in any significant way. 
 
 
 
 
